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Using monthly data from January 1996 to May 2010 for a panel of 76 developed and emerging 
economies and adopting an instrumental variable estimation technique by correcting for both 
heterogeneity and endogeneity with the generalised two-stage least squares (G2SLS, EC2SLS) 
procedure method suggested by Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) and Baltagi 
(1995), this paper provides empirical evidence that volatility of per capita GDP growth is 
reduced when there are positive changes in credit ratings; in other words when sovereign credit 
risk improves. To deal with potential simultaneity between sovereign credit ratings and output 
volatility, a system (3SLS) approach is undertaken, and our findings remain robust. By 
weakening the volatility dampening effects of ratings changes, it is found that the global 
financial crisis (GFC) has enhanced macroeconomic volatility. One of the channels via which 
sovereign rating changes affect growth volatility is the financial markets’ repricing of 
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Sovereign credit ratings issued by international credit rating agencies (CRAs) are one of the 
key variables affecting sovereign nations’ access to international credit markets (Ratha et al., 
2007, 2010). Sovereign credit ratings thus affect not only the process of obtaining funds from 
the loan market and the direction of international banking flows as identified in Kim and Wu 
(2011) but can also be effective in determining the flow of foreign direct investments and 
portfolio equity flows (Kim and Wu, 2008).  As the access to international financing is crucial 
for funding aggregate investments and consumption, there should be direct effects from 
sovereign credit ratings activity on individual countries’ economic growth. 
 
The contribution of this paper is to show that changes in the sovereign credit ratings of countries 
can convey useful information to creditors and investors in the international market and have 
consequences on the real economy. We empirically examine the effect of Standard and Poors’ 
(S&P) sovereign credit ratings and re-ratings on the volatility of output growth using monthly 
data over the period from 1996 to 2010 for a global sample of 76 countries.2 We hypothesise 
that a country with a higher credit rating is better able to access international capital markets 
because a high sovereign credit rating (and/or a rating upgrade) can lower the cost of borrowing 
and thereby smooth consumption and investment patterns and consequently reduce the 
volatility in output growth. To identify the channel via which sovereign rating changes affect 
output volatility, we also test the effect of credit ratings and changes in credit ratings on the 
market pricing of perceived sovereign default risk reflected in sovereign credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads. Supporting this hypothesis, Ozatay et al. (2009) illustrate that sovereign spreads 
                                                 
2 We focus only on foreign currency sovereign ratings assessments provided by S&P as previous studies have 
found that S&P rating changes exert the greatest impact on stock market returns and are less anticipated (see, e.g., 




depend on domestic fundamentals proxied by sovereign credit ratings. Furthermore, the paper 
also tests whether the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) increased output volatility by weakening 
the significant relationship between sovereign credit ratings and output volatility. 
 
The link between output volatility and economic growth is well-established. Ramey and Ramey 
(1995) reveal in their seminal paper that countries with a higher volatility of output also have 
a lower growth rate of output. This result remains unchanged even after controlling for other 
country-specific variables which are found to be robust in the literature such as the investment 
to GDP ratio.Given that high economic growth is what governments want to achieve, one of 
the key objectives of macroeconomic policies should also be targeted to reduce output 
volatility. Therefore, it is important to understand what determines output volatility and we 
contribute new evidence on the importance of sovereign credit rating assessments towards this 
goal.  
 
In the literature, Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) provide some insights into the empirical 
determinants of output volatility. They show that the development of the domestic financial 
sector plays a crucial role in lowering output volatility and that this relationship is non-linear. 
Prasad et al. (2004) demonstrate that increases in financial globalization measured in terms of 
cross border capital inflow and capital account liberalisation has, on average reduced output 
and consumption volatility in industrial economies and the “less financially integrated” 
developing economies. Therefore, enhanced access to foreign capital markets from 
improvements in sovereign credit assessments is likely to be an important factor determining 
output growth volatility. However to date, there has been a dearth of attention on the real 
economic effects of revisions in sovereign credit ratings despite the spate of sovereign rating 
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downgrades that have coincided with economic downturns in advanced economies in the post-
GFC era and we promptly address this void in this study. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the extant sovereign 
ratings literature. Section 3 presents the most important stylised facts for output growth 
volatility and sovereign credit ratings. Section 4 provides the empirical model and analysis of 
the results. In particular, this section analyses the impact of sovereign credit ratings on a variety 
of volatility models where a counterfactual analysis is presented. Finally, section 5 provides 
concluding remarks and sketches the major policy implications that follow from this research.  
2. Literature Review 
 
It has been noted that “the recent financial market turbulence has brought credit rating agencies 
under fire” and academics as well as policy-makers are arguing for a reform of the business 
model of CRAs (Portes 2008). Rating agencies are faced with a serious conflict of interest, to 
the extent that their remuneration comes from rated issuers (Mathis, McAndrews and Rochet, 
2009), both in the context of public or private borrowers. This is a crucial issue, given CRAs’ 
considerable and increasing role in international capital markets. In this context, there is a large 
and useful literature studying the impact of sovereign credit ratings on market prices and bond 
spreads. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) find that downgrades and upgrades have an impact 
on country risk and stock returns: these rating changes are transmitted across countries, with 
neighbour-country effects being more significant.  
 
The study of sovereign risk assessment has focused on comparing sovereign ratings to market 
spreads. For the period 1987-1994, Cantor and Packer (1996) find a greater impact on bond 
spreads from a rating change in the case of Moody’s or if it is related to speculative-grade 
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countries. Reisen and Von Maltzan (1999) show that sovereign ratings have asymmetric effects 
as in the period 1989-1997, Fitch, Moody’s and S&P’s downgrades have a significant impact 
on bond spreads, contrary to upgrades, which were anticipated by the market. For them, 
sovereign ratings have the potential to moderate euphoria among investors on emerging 
markets but credit rating agencies failed to exploit that potential in the 1990s. Sy (2002) 
highlights the strong negative relationship between sovereign credit ratings and declines in 
EMBI+ spreads during periods of high risk aversion (e.g., 1997-1998). Mora (2006) examines 
Moody’s and S&P’s ratings and concludes that the procyclicality of ratings is not ascertained 
when considering the post Asian financial crisis years. Analyzing sovereign ratings issued by 
the three rating agencies over 1993-2007, Gaillard (2009) finds that the procyclicality of ratings 
was much sharper during periods of high risk aversion (1997-1998 in particular) than periods 
of low risk aversion (2005-2007). In a different way, Cavallo et al. (2008) develop a simple 
Hausman specification test and find that there is some informational content in sovereign 
ratings that is not completely captured by market spreads. Additional tests reinforce their 
conclusion that sovereign ratings matter to financial market participants. Lastly, going beyond 
the traditional “ratings vs. spreads” view, Roubini and Manasse (2005) present an original 
sovereign risk assessment methodology by using a binary recursive tree. This enables them to 
better discuss appropriate policy options to prevent crises. 
 
3. Sovereign credit ratings, macroeconomic volatility and the stylized facts 
 It can be seen from the survey of the literature in section 2 that the focus of the literature  has 
been on analysing the effect of sovereign credit ratings on financial variables and not on 
macroeconomic variables. Sovereign credit ratings can have effects on macroeconomic 
volatility because higher credit ratings improve a country’s creditworthiness which lowers the 
cost of borrowing in international capital markets. This allows countries to borrow in bad times, 
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smooth consumption and reduce growth volatility. Sovereign credit ratings can also serve as a 
signal for the overall fiscal discipline of the economy, e.g., a country with an excessive 
government deficit will be assigned a lower sovereign credit rating and vice versa. A high 
sovereign rating can signal macroeconomic strength and this can work to boost both domestic 
and foreign investors’ confidence thereby reducing output volatility.  
The paper uses monthly data on sovereign credit ratings for foreign currency denominated debt 
provided by Standard and Poors for the period from January 1996 to May 2010 in 76 developed 
and emerging economies. In Figure 1 the graphs of sovereign credit ratings, the changes in 
sovereign ratings and growth volatility are combined together. The data shown are average 
values for all the countries in the sample. The first panel in Figure 1 shows the dynamics of 
sovereign credit ratings from 1996 to 2010. The red line indicates the time since the onset of 
the global financial crisis (GFC). It can be seen that average monthly ratings have gone up 
throughout the late 90s and early 00s and have remained more or less constant from the early 
months of 2000 until 2003. There seems to be a gradual decline of sovereign credit ratings from 
late 2003 until 2006 when it starts rising again but only up to 2007 when GFC sets in coupled 






The second panel in Figure 1 shows the average changes in sovereign credit rating for the 
sample period. It can be seen that in the period prior to 2004, the frequency of positive rating 
changes was high compared with the period from 2004 to 2010. In the latter period the 
frequency of negative ratings is much higher. 
 
The third panel of Figure 1 shows the dynamics of growth volatility for the same time period. 
There seems to be three distinct phases. The early months of 1996 to 2000 is a period of high 
volatility followed by a relatively tranquil period from 2001 to 2004 where growth volatility 
has been much lower. From 2005 onward another high volatility period sets in throughout the 
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These figures suggest that there may be a possible link between sovereign credit ratings and 
output volatility. Before investigating in an econometric model, we first combine the sovereign 
ratings and/or its changes together with output volatility in separate graphs. This is done in 
Figures 2 and 3 respectively. In Figure 2, the inverse relationship between sovereign credit 




Figure 3 provides a similar analysis between output volatility and changes in sovereign ratings. 
High positive changes in sovereign credit ratings and low negative changes in sovereign rating 
are associated with higher growth volatility. From January 1996  to January 2000 – a period of 
high growth volatility – the frequency of large positive changes in sovereign credit quality is 
prominent. Similarly, from January 2005 to May 2010 – another period of high growth 


















































Based on the graphical analysis of the data provided, it is possible to conclude that sovereign 
credit quality and growth volatility could be related as argued in the beginning of this section. 
The next section will present results based on a formal econometric model to test for a link 
between sovereign credit ratings and growth volatility and if this relationship is robust. 
 
4. Econometric Model and Analysis of Results 
To facilitate understanding the link between sovereign ratings and output volatility, this section 
will undertake an empirical analysis of the key variables. The specification that will be 



























































1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1 2008m1 2010m1
Year, Month
rating change volatility





Where VOLit is the volatility of the growth of per capita real GDP for country i which is 
computed as deviation of actual growth rate from the trend following the methodology in Rao 
and Hassan (2012) and uit is the error term. RATINGit is a linearly transformed series of 
sovereign credit ratings over time, DRATINGit are the changes in sovereign credit ratings, GFC 
(Global Financial Crisis) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 between July, 2007 
to May 2010, and zero otherwise, Xit is a matrix of control variables which includes the price 
of oil (OIL) and (STOCK) which is the measure of the total value of shares traded during the 
month (current US$). It is commonly used as a proxy for financial market trading activity and 
stock liquidity and more broadly for financial development. It has been shown in the extant 
literature to be important for explaining global growth opportunities (see for example, Bekaert 
et al., 2007). 
 
To explain output volatility we control for the world oil price and financial development as 
measured by the value of stock trading in the country concerned. First, oil is recognised as a 
critical energy input into production and that world oil prices are barometers of global 
economic conditions (Darby, 1982). Furthermore, there is a well-developed literature 
establishing the clear link between financial development and economic growth (see for 
example, Levine and Zervos, 1998). 
 
The expected signs of the estimated coefficients are as follows. Firstly, since it is expected that 
sovereign credit ratings and their changes are expected to reduce growth volatility, the expected 
signs of β1 and β2 are negative. However, the coefficient of change in sovereign credit rating 
(DRATING), i.e. β2 is more important and meaningful than the coefficient of RATING, i.e. β1. 
The reason is that the volatility of GDP should be more reactive to changes in the informational 
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content of the economy which is more appropriately conveyed by ratings changes. Secondly, 
because the GFC has created greater economic uncertainty and financial instability, the 
expected sign of β3 is positive. Thirdly, the expected sign of β4 which is the coefficient of the 
interacting term is a priori ambiguous. A positive coefficient will imply the GFC has 
strengthened the sovereign rating – volatility relationship, and a negative coefficient will imply 
that it has weakened it. With regard to the control variables, it is expected that a higher oil price 
and an increase in the number of stocks traded will increase growth volatility and hence the 
signs of their estimated coefficients would be positive.  
 
The results of the estimation of equation (1) using a fixed effect within transformation estimator 
are presented in Table 1. At first the equation is estimated without any interaction terms and 
control variables, and subsequently the control variables are added. The estimated results 
without and with the control variables are in columns (1) and (2) respectively. It can be seen in 
column (1) that the sign of RATING is negative and significant. It can also be seen that the 
coefficient of DRATING is negative and significant at the 1 percent significance level. Both of 
these estimations show that sovereign credit ratings are negatively associated with growth 
volatility. The estimated coefficient of the GFC, an indicator variable, is positive as expected, 
but it is not significant. The robustness of these results depends on the addition of the 
interaction term and the control variables to the regression equation. This is done in column 
(2). It can be seen that the estimated coefficient of RATING remains negative and is also 
significant at the 1 percent level while there is only a very marginal increase of the magnitude 
in the estimated coefficient of DRATING but it is still negative and significant at the 1 percent 
level. Based on the current model, it can be concluded that higher sovereign credit ratings is 
associated with lower growth volatility in this sample. The coefficient of GFC is almost similar 
to its previous value and it is still positive but insignificant. This does not give sufficient ground 
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to conclude that the GFC heightened growth volatility. Interestingly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term turns out to be negative though insignificant at all conventional significance 
levels (p-value = 0.101).  
Table 1 
 
Dependent variable: Volatility of per capita GDP growth 
















GFC*DRATING  -0.000116 
(-1.64) 
OIL  2.51e-06 
(2.44)** 



















R2 (within) 0.0035 0.0042 






No. of observation/countries 10061/76 9952/76 
Note: RATING = linearly transformed series of sovereign credit ratings over time; 
DRATING = are the changes in sovereign credit ratings; GFC = (Global Financial 
Crisis) indicator variable that takes the value of 1 between July, 2007 to May 
2010, and zero otherwise; OIL = world oil price and STOCK = total value of 
shares traded during the month (current US$). 
 





The test of the joint significance of the DRATING variables turns out to be insignificant. Hence 
no conclusion can be made on whether the GFC has contributed to growth volatility by 
interacting with credit ratings or not. Among the control variables it is found that world oil 
price is also a contributor to growth volatility because the estimated coefficient of the OIL 
variable is positive and significant. The same cannot be concluded for the other control 
variable, because STOCK is insignificant. 
 
The results in Table 1 which are analysed above will have to be taken with some degree of 
caution. The estimated coefficients for the sovereign rating variables may be biased because 
the variable RATING could be endogenous and correlated with the error term. Moreover, 
because the 76 countries in the sample are chosen from different regions around the world, 
there is a possibility that the variance of the error term exhibits some form of heteroscedasticity. 
These two problems need to be addressed in order to have some meaningful results. Therefore 
to account for endogeneity equation (1) is estimated using an instrumental variable (IV) 














ititit vIVRATING  1                (2.1)   
0)(  itit uRATINGE but 0)(  itit vIVE              (2.2) 
 
The results of the IV estimation of equation (2) are presented in Table 2. The first column 
presents the fixed effect-IV results (within transformation) correcting for endogeneity but 
assuming standard properties for the error term. To ensure that number of not included 
instruments exceeds the number of possibly endogenous variable RATING, we included two 
non-included instruments to test whether or not the not included instruments are exogenous. 
13 
 
The instruments include a composite risk measure (COMPRISK) sourced from the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as it incorporates aspects of financial, economic and political risks 
within countries and a realised equity market return (RRET) measure which we computed from 
S&P500 index for each country in the sample. The results are qualitatively similar to those 
found in the simple fixed-effect estimation in Table 1. Both the coefficients RATING and 
DRATING are negative and significant at 5 percent level, implying that the volatility reducing 
effect of sovereign credit ratings is present. The GFC indicator variable remains insignificant 
as before, however the estimated coefficient of the interaction between the GFC and DRATING 
is negative and significant at the conventional 5 percent level. Hence it can be concluded that 
the GFC did contribute to growth volatility by somehow interacting with the DRATING 
variable. The estimated coefficients on the control variables OIL becomes insignificant while 
that on STOCK becomes significant. The p-value Saragan test statistic imply that the 
exogeneity condition of the non-included instruments have been met. 
 
The estimation of the model controlling for country specific heterogeneity implies that that 
there is no time effect. It is possible that some countries in the sample have fixed country effects 
while others have fixed time effects. This requires the use of the random effect estimator. We 
employ the generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS) procedure suggested by Balestra and 
Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) to account for potential endogeneity and random effects. 
In addition the expected bias due to the existence of heteroscdasticity in the error term in the 
data is also corrected for using the method of error corrected generalised two-stage least 
squares (EC2SLS) estimator as suggested by Baltagi (1995). Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 
presents the generalised 2SLS (G2SLS) and error corrected generalised 2SLS (EC2SLS) 
estimations. In column (2) the results of the G2SLS estimation are presented. Note that these 
results are very similar to those in column (1). The coefficients of RATING and DRATING are 
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negative and significant at 5 percent level, as well as the estimated coefficient on the interaction 
term (GFC*DRATING). The joint test on the coefficients on both DRATING is comfortably  
Table 2 
 
Dependent variable: Volatility of per capita GDP growth 
(Instrumental Variable Estimator) 


















































Summary Statistics  
 




























R2 (within) 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 










9809/76 9809/76 9809/76 
Note: For variable definitions please see notes under Table 1. Constant dropped out in FE-




rejected. The exogeneity of the instruments is also confirmed via the Sargan test. It is now 
therefore possible to conclude that the GFC has affected growth volatility by interacting with 
sovereign rating changes. 
 
In column (2) the variance of the error term is assumed to be homoscedastic. However, we 
relax this assumption in column (3) in which equation (2) is estimated using the EC2SLS 
estimator where the variance of the error term is allowed to vary across countries. Having 
correcting for both endogeneity and heteroscedasticity enable us to obtain more robust results.  
It can be seen that the results in column (3) are quite similar to those obtained in column (2) 
and that the link between sovereign credit rating variables and output volatility therefore 
remains negative and significant. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term 
is also significant. Therefore it can be concluded that the volatility dampening effects of 
sovereign credit ratings is robust to alternative estimators and also that the GFC has contributed 
to the volatility of output growth by weakening this relationship. 
 
In estimating equations (1) and (2), the dependent variable was the volatility of per capita GDP 
growth which is calculated as the squared deviation of actual growth from the mean. This is an 
overall measure of output variability. Perhaps even more important are the economic 
downturns that occur periodically and have long characterised market economies. To analyse 
the link between rating and economic downturn, a limited dependent variable analysis is 


















The right hand side variables are the same as before but the dependent variable DOWN has 
been transformed into a binary variable which takes a value equal to 1 when per capita GDP 
growth is negative or 0 when growth is positive. This allows us to analyse if credit ratings has 
any implications for negative growth only. We estimate equation (3) using both PROBIT and 
LOGIT models and choose the best performing model using information criteria such as AIC 
and BIC.  
Table 3 
 
Dependent variable: Binary variable when per capita GDP growth is negative, dependent 























































Summary Statistics  
 
   
Log likelihood -551.771 -552.004 -11751.216 
AIC 1117.543 1118.01  
BIC 1168.429 1168.896  
Wald test of exogeneity 
(p-value) 
  0.185 
No. of 
observation/countries 
9809/76 9809/76 9809/76 





The  results are summarised in Table (3), where column (1) represents the PROBIT random 
effect estimation of equation (3) and column (2) represents the LOGIT random effect 
estimations. The results are very similar across these two estimators, but in terms of the 
information criteria as given by AIC and BIC, it seems the PROBIT is the best performing 
model. However, it can be seen that in both estimations the coefficient on RATING is negative 
and significant at the 10 percent level of significance. So there is some evidence, albeit very 
weak, that credit ratings also lead to a reduction in economic downturn.  
 
Estimating only a PROBIT random effect model leaves open the possibility that the variable 
RATING could be endogenous, generating a bias in the estimate reported in column (1). This 
problem is further investigated by estimating equation (3) with probit instrumental variable 
(PROBIT-IV) estimator where the endogenous regressor is RATING. The results are reported 
in column (3) where we can still find the coefficient of RATING negative and significant at 10 
percent level. We have used COMPRISK and RRET as instruments and the Wald test do not 





The final model presented in this paper to analyse the sovereign credit rating – output volatility 
link is based on the simultaneous interaction between these two variables—just as sovereign 
credit ratings can affect output volatility; it can also be affected by output volatility. A 
simultaneous relationship between sovereign ratings and output volatility requires an 
appropriate model and estimator that can account for this joint determination of ratings and 



























The variables in equation (4.1) are the same as before and some of the variables in equation 
(4.2) are potential determinants of sovereign credit ratings. MONEY is monetary policy stance, 
INF is the rate of inflation, COMPRISK is composite risk as measured by ICRG, LGDP stands 
for the log of GDP, GROWTH is per capita GDP growth, and VINF is the volatility of inflation. 
To explain sovereign credit ratings, our choice of control variables has been guided by the 
literature on the fundamental economic determinants of country risk and sovereign default risk 
(Cantor and Packer, 1996, Hilscher and Nosbusch, 2010) indicating that macroeconomic 
variables like inflation (INF, VINF), GDP (LGDP and GROWTH), interest rates (MONEY) are 
important determinants as deteriorations in a country’s macroeconomic conditions will 
severely affect the government’s ability to repay its debts. We also include a composite risk 
measure (COMPRISK) sourced from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) as it 
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incorporates aspects of financial, economic and political risks within countries and has been 
documented to be important for growth opportunities by Bekaert et al. (2007).  
 
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are jointly estimated as a system using the three stage least square 
estimator and the results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) presents the estimated 
coefficients of the volatility equation. It can be seen that the signs of the estimated coefficients 
and their significance are very similar to those in Table 3. In particular, the estimated 
coefficient of RATING and DRATIING are negative and significant as before confirming the 
notion that improvements in sovereign credit quality can reduce growth volatility. What can 
also be seen from the volatility equation in Table 4 is that the estimated coefficient on the 
interaction term (GFC*DRATING) is negative and significant. The joint test on the coefficients 
of DRATING clearly rejects the null hypothesis. This leads to the conclusion that whilst the 
direct effect of the GFC on growth volatility has been insignificant, the indirect effect of the 
GFC has been its contribution in weakening the volatility reducing effect of sovereign credit 
quality. Among the control variables, oil prices (OIL) have consistently contributed towards 
higher output volatility as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients in all model 
specifications. It might be worth mentioning that the R2 is quite low for the equation 4.1, which 
could be because of a poor fit of the model due to unavailability of more suitable control 
variables. However, this is not entirely unexpected as the literature on the determinants of 
growth volatility has yet not become enough mature to suggest the range of control variables 
that might be important. 
 
In column (2) the estimated coefficients of the RATING equation is presented. It can be seen 
that volatility itself is a major determinant of sovereign credit ratings because the estimated 
sign of VOL is negative and significant. This implies that increase in GDP volatility will lead 
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to lower ratings. With regard to the policy variables MONEY, INF and VINF seem to be 
important as these are instruments for conducting monetary policy. The variable MONEY 
which is an indicator variable set equal to one if the short-term interest rate was increased (until 
the next interest rate cut), and zero otherwise represents the monetary policy stance of the 
authority. With a positive and significant estimated coefficient on this variable it can be 
concluded that a tightening in monetary policy can increase sovereign credit ratings because it 
shows the commitment of the monetary authority to discipline the economy. On the contrary 
high inflation and inflation volatility can lead to lower sovereign ratings as the estimated 
coefficients on INF and VINF are negative and significant at the 1 percent level. High inflation 
and high volatility of inflation represents an unstable macroeconomic environment which leads 






Dependent variables: Volatility of per capita GDP growth, Sovereign Credit Ratings 
(Three stage least squares (3SLS) estimator) 






















STOCK  2.10e-17 
(0.884) 
 
VOL  -11.6914 
(-4.02)*** 
MONEY  0.36735 
(8.02)*** 
INF  -0.22152 
(-6.59)*** 
COMPRISK  0.33421 
(73.37)*** 
LGDP  1.43645 
(51.11)*** 
GROWTH  0.05054 
(0.02) 
















R2  0.0075 0.8269 
RMSE 0.0009 2.0859 
Identification: (Equation 4.1 
& 4.2) 
Identified  Identified  
Identification of System Identified 






No. of observation/countries 8873/76 8873/76 
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Note: For variable definitions of column (1) please see notes under Table 1. VOL = 
volatility of the growth of per capita real GDP; MONEY = monetary policy stance; INF = 
the rate of inflation; COMPRISK = composite risk as measured by ICRG; LGDP = log of 
GDP; GROWTH = per capita GDP growth, and VINF = volatility of inflation. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The crucial aspect of the system of equations estimated in Table 4 is identification of the 
structural parameters. The usual order condition relating to single equation IV estimation is 
satisfied by counting the included endogenous variables and non-included exogenous variables 
and the sufficient rank condition pertains to the rank of the matrix of instruments. For a system 
of equations like 4.1 and 4.2, in the 3SLS estimation context it could be possible that each 
equation is individually identified yet the system is unidentified. In this context of identification 
what is referred is the unique relationship between the matrices of structural coefficients and 
the reduced form of the linear system. For the system is to be identified, unique values of the 
structural coefficients from those of the reduced form must be derived (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 
218). We perform a check on the condition for identification of our structural system and find 
that it is satisfied for each equation individually and also for the system as a whole. The results 
are reported in Appendix I.  
 
Another issue with the estimation of the system of equations like 4.1 and 4.2 is that, although 
3SLS estimator explicitly takes simultaneity into account as well as the cross-equation error 
correlations to improve large sample efficiency, it imposes the assumption of homoscedasticity 
on the error term (Wooldridge. 2002). Hayashi (2000) shows 3SLS estimator is a special case 
of multiple equation GMM estimator, and with non-i.i.d. errors Optimal System GMM 
estimator produce consistent and efficient estimates. Therefore as a final robustness check we 
estimate the system of equations in (4.1) and (4.2) using multiple equation GMM estimator 
with heteroschedasticity-consistent standard errors and the results are presented in Table A1 in 
Appendix II. Although there are some changes compared to what is found in Table 4, the results 
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with the GMM estimates are on average comparable to those with 3SLS. The most fundamental 
result with regard to the central hypothesis of this paper remains unaltered. This is confirmed 
by looking at the signs of the estimated coefficients of DRATING and the interaction term 
between GFC and DRATING, both of which are negative and significant at 1 percent. As 
mentioned earlier in this section, the coefficient of change in sovereign credit rating 
(DRATING), i.e. β2 is more important because the volatility of GDP should be more reactive 
to changes in the informational content of the economy which is more appropriately conveyed 
by ratings changes. The estimated negative sign of interaction term implies GFC has weakened 
volatility reducing effect of rating changes. 
 
5. Sovereign Credit Spreads and Ratings 
In the preceding sections an attempt has been made to empirically establish a link between 
sovereign credit ratings and growth volatility. The evidence confirms that such a relationship 
exists and that it is robust and unambiguous. In this section we make an attempt to explain 
why improvements in a country’s sovereign credit assessment will reduce output volatility . 
The mechanism by which sovereign credit ratings and changes in ratings affect growth 
volatility can be attributed to the relationship between ratings and the sovereign credit default 
swap (CDS) spread.  That is sovereign credit rating changes may cause higher volatility in 
the sovereign CDS spreads exacerbating the uncertainty of the market’s perception on 
whether a sovereign is going to default and this has real economic consequences and can 






Rating Changes and Sovereign CDS spread and volatility 
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WITHN R2 0.266 0.105 0.276 0.106 
  
In Table 5 we report generalised least squares (GLS) estimates on the effects of sovereign 
credit rating changes on both CDS spread and CDS spread volatility. The volatility of 
sovereign CDS spreads (CDS Volatilityi,t) is computed as the arithmetic averages of the 
square of daily CDS spread changes within calendar months. The estimations control for 
unobserved effects using random effect (RE) models with clustered error which gives within 
group heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors. Our variable of interest 
is DRATING. We also create a new variable POSITIVE DRATING which is an indicator 
variable taking a value equal to 1 when DRATING is non-zero and positive and zero 
otherwise. Similarly, NEGATIVE DRATING is equal to 1 when a rating change is negative. 
We have also used world oil price, GDP growth per capita and inflation rate as control 
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variables for determining sovereign CDS spreads and its volatility as Ismailescu and Kazemi 
(2010) have shown that these two measures of sovereign credit risk closely track each other. 
The findings show that credit rating changes have a negative impact on CDS spread and on 
its volatility. This can be seen from the coefficient on DRATING which is negative and 
significant. However what is interesting to note is that this effect is asymmetric. The effect of 
positive changes in sovereign credit ratings is negative but insignificant. However, the effect 
of negative rating changes is positive and significant for both sovereign CDS spread and its 
volatility. However, since on the aggregate DRATING lowers sovereign CDS spread and CDS 
spread volatility, sovereign credit rating changes can help reduce uncertainty in the overall 




The empirical fact that output volatility may induce lower growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995) 
is an important finding for policy makers because reducing growth volatility can be a means 
to achieving higher economic growth. Hence, in this study we investigate the relationship 
between sovereign credit ratings and output volatility.  Using monthly data from January 1996 
to May 2010 for a panel of 76 developed and emerging economies and adopting an 
instrumental variable estimation technique by correcting for both heterogeneity and 
endogeneity using the generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS, EC2SLS) procedure 
method suggested by Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) and Baltagi (1995), 
this paper provides empirical evidence that an alternative channel via which growth volatility 
is reduced is through improvements in sovereign credit ratings. The paper also provides a new 
insight on the effect of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). We reveal that the GFC contributed 
towards increased macroeconomic volatility by weakening the volatility dampening effect of 
sovereign credit ratings. Acknowledging the simultaneity between sovereign ratings and 
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growth volatility, the paper adopts a system approach and uses a three stage least squares 
(3SLS) estimator to ascertain that the volatility reducing effect of sovereign ratings is robust. 
The 3SLS estimates also show that monetary policy stance, inflation and inflation volatility 
are major determinants of sovereign ratings. Hence, monetary policy can be effectively used 
to increase a country’s sovereign credit rating and to achieve lower output volatility. Lastly, 
we find that changes in sovereign credit ratings lowers sovereign credit spreads and spread 
volatility and we postulate this reduces economic uncertainty and in turn leads to lower output 







Variable Data Definition Sources 
VOL Volatility of per capita GDP 
growth measured as squared 
deviation of per capita GDP 
growth from its trend. 
Calculated by author.  
Data from Datastream. 
RATING Sovereign credit ratings 
provided by Standard and 
Poors.  The ratings have been 
converted to a linear time 
series following Gande and 
Parsley (2005). 
Standard and Poors. 
 
DRATING First difference on RATING Calculated by author. 
GFC Binary variable =1 if time 
equals 2010:07 to 2010:05. It 
represents the period during 
the Global Financial Crisis. 
Calculated by author. 
OIL World oil price 
 
Datastream. 
STOCK Total value of shares traded 




MONEY An indicator variable set 
equal to one if the short-term 
interest rate was increased 
(until the next interest rate 
cut), zero otherwise. 
 
Datastream. 
INF Inflation rate.  Datastream.  
VINF Volatility of inflation rate 
measured as the deviation of 
actual inflation from its mean. 
Calculated by author. 
LGDP Log of Gross domestic 
product - value of goods 








COMPRISK Composite risk measure.  International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) 
RRET Realised equity market return Calculated by the author 




Appendix I – Identification test of system of equations 4.1 and 4.2 
Endogenous Coefficient Matrix 
 VOL RATING 
VOL -1 0.5 
RATING 0 -1 
 
Exogenous Coefficient Matrix 
 RATING DRATING GFC GFC*DRATING OIL STOCK 
VOL 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
RATING 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Exogenous Coefficient Matrix 
 VOL MONEY INFLATION COMPRISK LGDP GROWTH VINF 
VOL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
RATING 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Note: Eq. 4.1 & 4.2 individually identified and the system is identified. These results based on Stata 
procedure “checkreg3”3 which allows to see that the necessary and sufficient rank condition is 
satisfied for each of the N equations in the system unless which the system is unidentified. The values 
0.5 are used only as placeholders to check identification status. 
 
  
                                                 
3 Baum, C.F., (2007)  checkreg3: Stata module to check identification status of 
        simultaneous equations system.  http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s456877.html 
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Appendix II – System GMM estimation of equations 4.1 and 4.2 
Table A1 
Dependent variables: Volatility of per capita GDP growth, Sovereign Credit Ratings 
(System GMM) 






















STOCK  -1.47e-14 
(-5.96)*** 
 
VOL   -29.4800 
(-1.36) 
MONEY  -4.7099 
(-1.58) 
INF  -2.1958 
(-9.88)*** 
COMPRISK  0.04622 
(1.84)* 
 
LGDP  2.3124  
(11.73)*** 
GDP GROWTH  -2.3711 
(-0.12) 
VINF  0.20074 
(1.25) 
No. of observation/countries 6518/76 6518/76 
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